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I. INTRODUCTION
Among both married and divorced couples, mothers continue
to be the primary caretakers of children.' Many of these women
t Judge, Minnesota Court of Appeals; trial judge, Worthington, Minnesota
1975-1984; J.D. 1960, University of Minnesota Law School; L.L.M. 1990, University
of Virginia.
tt Law Clerk to the Honorable Gary L. Crippen, Minnesota Court of
Appeals, 2000-2001; J.D. 2000, University of Minnesota Law School. This author
would like to thank Jean Lastine of Central Minnesota Legal Services for her
helpful comments about primary caretakers living below the poverty level.
1. FRANCINE M. DEUTSCH, HALVING IT ALL 1 (1999) (stating what has become
"the standard scenario in most dual-earner households: the mother and father
both work in the paid labor force, but the mother also works a 'second shift' at
home, a shift that is not shared fully by her husband") (citing multiple studies);
Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in
Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARv. L. REv. 727, 769 n.166, 772-73 (1988)
(stating that the vast majority of working women are primary parents). Courts may
also view more favorably the efforts of fathers who help with parenting but still are
not primary caretakers. Mary Ann Mason & Ann Quirk, Are Mothers Losing Custody?
Read My Lips: Trends in Judicial Decision-Making in Custody Disputes-i 920, 1960,
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lack the financial ability to protect their children's interests.
Developments in Minnesota law, however, reveal indifference to
these realities and create numerous obstacles to primary caretaking
mothers who seek to establish that their custodial care is in the best
interests of the child. Lawmakers have been enthusiastic for joint
custody and parenting plans while denigrating the preference for
primary caretakers and threatening primary caretakers with easy
loss of adequate child support, impermanence of their custodial
care, and denial of freedom to move elsewhere without risking a
change of custody.
Protection of primary caretaking eroded in several stages. In
the 1970s, the legislature abolished the 1950's and 1960's
preference for the mother. At the end of the 1980s, the legislature
declared an end to the preference for the primary caretaker. To
date, the judiciary has not challenged that determination or since
addressed the importance of the primary caretaker in the child's
life. More recently, the legislature has created a presumption that
joint legal custody is in the child's best interests, and the
Hortis/Valento3 and Rogers line of cases have added collateral child
support rewards for the non-custodial parent who obtains the label
of joint physical custodian. Finally, in 1999, the legislature created
parenting plans, further denigrating the preference placed on
primary caretakers.
As child custody standards continue to evolve, legislators and
judges should give primary caretaker placements much more
consideration, and the law should pay special attention to the class
of mothers who are primary parents.
1990, and 1995, 31 FAM. L.Q. 215, 235 (1997) ("Perhaps 'working mother' has
replaced 'moral unfitness' as a criteria for granting custody to fathers.").
2. MINN. STAT. § 518.17, subd. 2 (2000).
3. Valento v. Valento, 385 N.W.2d 860, 8"63 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(requiring a parent to pay the child support amount indicated by the guidelines
only during the periods of time that the other parent has custody of the children);
Hortis v. Hortis, 367 N.W.2d 633, 636 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (offsetting the
smaller obligation of one parent against larger obligation of other parent).
4. Rogers v. Rogers, 622 N.W.2d 813 (Minn. 2001).
5. MINN. STAT. § 518.1705 (Supp. 2001). This statute offers divorcing
parents the option of creating a parenting plan "in lieu of an order for child
custody and parenting time." Id. at subd. 3(a). The terms of parenting plans are
negotiated by the parents and must include "a schedule of the time each parent
spends with the child; a designation of decision making responsibilities regarding
the child; and a method of dispute resolution." Id. at subd. 2.
[Vol. 28:2
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II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE CHILD'S INTEREST IN
PROTECTING THE PRIMARY CARETAKER RELATIONSHIP
Primary caretakers provide "daily nurturance, care and
support ' for their children. Minnesota courts adopted a
preference for placing children with their primary caretakers
because child psychologists found that maintaining the child's
relationship with the primary caretaker provided "emotional and
psychological stability to the child's sense of security, happiness,1 . ,,7
and adaptation. Placing children with their primary caretakers
furthered the best interests of children.
Only thirty years ago, Minnesota courts employed the tender
years doctrine because society assumed that young children would
8be better off with their mothers. At that time, only a small
percentage of women worked outside the home. The tender years
preference can be traced to the Minnesota Supreme Court's early
(and bold) commitment to the best-interests standard when the
court overrode a statutory mandate that fathers receive custody and
awarded custody to a mother due to her role as the primary
caretaker.9 This preference was absolute for some trial judges, who
boldly declared bad news for fathers who had the temerity to
suggest that they be the custodial parent.
The social order has changed, but less completely than some
might assume. Many women are employed outside the home, and
many men are primary caretakers, both before and after divorce.
Recent Father's Day articles highlighted the 2.2 million single
fathers who have primary custody of their children, a sixty-two
percent increase since 1990.' ° The changing image of families has
prompted legal changes to accommodate the special circumstances
of children affected by these new arrangements. But another
statistic is too easily overlooked: most children continue to have a
primary parenting relationship with their mothers, and women
6. Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 711 (Minn. 1985).
7. Id. (citing JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 31-35 (1979)).
8. Meinhardt v. Meinhardt, 261 Minn. 272, 276, 111 N.W.2d 782, 784 (1961)
("[0] ther things being equal, the welfare of children of tender years is best served
by their being left in the care of their mother.").
9. Flint v. Flint, 63 Minn. 187, 189-90, 65 N.W. 272, 273 (1895).
10. Tara Gatewood, More Single Dads are Receiving the Ultimate Father's Day
Gift-Their Kids, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), June 17, 2001, at El, available at
http://www.pioneerplanet.com/seven-days/tod/news/docs/66494.htm; Adam
Stern, Single Dad: Popular But Misunderstood, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2001, at STI.
2001]
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head the overwhelming majority of single-parent families." In fact,
single mothers head 26% of all families with children under age
eighteen, while single fathers head only 5%. 12 More to the point,
early data from the 2000 census show that for divorced families,
fathers head 913,000 households and mothers head 3,392,000
households, amounting to approximately 21% and 79%
respectively. 3
A. Preference for Placement with the Mother
The first reaction to the courts' strong preference for mothers
came with the Minnesota Legislature's 1969 amendments directing
the court to place no weight on the sex of the parent in
determining custody. 4 The legislature revised the statute again in
1974 to detail specific factors for the courts to consider in
determining a custodial placement. 5  Despite these statutory
changes, the dominant rule of law changed little in the courts.
Giving increased meaning to these changes, the supreme court
explained that trial courts must make findings of fact on those
factors that are brought into dispute 6 because detailed findings
facilitate judicial review and unmask hidden biases in decision-
making. Similarly, the Berndt17 and Weatherly18 cases suggest a
supreme court interest in protecting primary caretaking mothers
from judges inclined to arbitrarily overlook the interest of the child
in being with the child's mother.
Judicial recognition of the interests served by primary-
caretaker placement culminated with the supreme court's decision
11. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROFILE OF GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
FOR THE UNITED STATES: 2000 tbl.DP-1 (2000), at http://www.census.gov/Press-
Release/www/2001/tables/dp-us_2000.PDF (showing that 7,561,874 families with
children under age eighteen are headed by single females).
12. Jason Fields & Lynne M. Casper, Families and Living Arrangements,
CURRENr POPULATION REP. (U.S. Census Bureau), June 2001, at 7, at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001 pubs/p20-537.pdf.
13. Id. at 8 tbl.4.
14. Act ofJune 6, 1969, ch. 1030, § 1, 1969 Minn. Laws 2081, 2081 (codified
at MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (1969)) (stating that courts "shall not prefer one parent
over the other" in custody decisions).
15. Act of Mar. 28, 1974, ch. 330, § 2, 1974 Minn. Laws 555, 555-56 (codified
at MINN. STAT. § 518.17, subd. 1 (1974)).
16. Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 311 Minn. 76, 82, 249 N.W.2d 168, 171 (1976)
("[W]e conclude that the family court must make written findings which properly
reflect its consideration of the factors listed in Minn. St. 518.17, subd. 1.").
17. Berndtv. Berndt, 292 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Minn. 1980).
18. Weatherly v. Weatherly, 330 N.W.2d 890, 892 (Minn. 1983).
[Vol. 28:2
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in Pikula, with the court declaring that children should be placed
with their primary parent. '9 The supreme court hoped that the
preference would "reduce litigation and provide more predictable
results," in recognition of the tension between giving the courts
discretion to make individualized decisions in the interests of
justice while providing predictable decision-making.'o The
presumption also recognized and attempted to neutralize the
difference in bargaining power between primary caretakers and the
traditional breadwinner spouse. Traditional primary parents, who
are preoccupied with needs of the home and children and
concerned about meeting future expenses, are vulnerable to
intimidation by an opposing party who threatens litigation to
compel the primary caretaker to concede maintenance, support, or
property settlements in exchange for custody.2'
B. Corresponding Rights of Sole Custodians
Developments through 1985 established the central features of
child-custody law that protect primary parents by articulating their
rights as sole custodians. Child support guidelines provide a full
and more dependable right of support for sole physical custodians,
and the legislature has continued to support the guidelines
approach. The courts and legislature strengthened the validity of
the original custody determinations by mandating thorough trial
court findings and eliminating the court of appeals' ability to
approve decisions that were supported by the record but lacked
22adequate findings.
The legislature, sharing judicial concern for a child's stable
relationships, protected the permanency of the primary caretaking
19. Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 713 (Minn. 1985) ("[W]e hold the
factors set forth in section 518.17, subd. 1, require that when both parents seek
custody of a child too young to express a preference for a particular parent and
one parent has been the primary caretaker, custody be awarded to the primary
parent absent a showing that that parent is unfit to be the custodian.").
20. Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child
Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota's Four Year Experiment with the
Primary Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REv. 427, 429-30 (1990).
21. Id. at 449-50.
22. Compare Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 311 Minn. 76, 82, 249 N.W.2d 168, 171-72
(1976) (establishing the need for findings on all the best interest factors), with
Moylan v. Moylan, 384 N.W.2d 859, 865 (Minn. 1986) (reversing and remanding
the court of appeals' affirmance of a child support modification based on the
record because the trial court's decision did not reveal "whether the trial court
considered factors expressly mandated by the legislature" (citation omitted)).
2001]
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relationship after the court entered the original custody
determination by making modification of the arrangement
permissible only when the non-custodial parent could show that
the child's present circumstances endanger the child's health.23
The supreme court further honored the relationship by creating a
presumption that a primary caretaker could remove the child from
the state.14 In order to defeat the presumption, the non-custodial
parent had to show that the move would endanger the child'5 or
the custodial parent intended to interfere with the non-custodial
parent's visitation by movingic This protection developed because
child psychologists found that it would be detrimental to the child's
psychological development to interrupt the existing parent-child
relationship by altering custody.27 During this time, courts strongly
discouraged joint physical custody because dividing time betweenthe parents was thought to harm the child.
III. POSTMORTEM FOR THE PRIMARY CARETAKER PREFERENCE
The Pikula presumption favoring primary caretakers produced
a backlash that badly diminished the strength of these caretakers'
cases for a sole custody placement. From the beginning, the
preference produced a frenzy of litigation (a cottage industry for
lawyers, who already were drawn much more frequently into this
field because of the explosion of divorces beginning in the 1970s)
where fathers attempted to establish leverage by demonstrating
that they were, at a minimum, equally involved in the superficial
measures of primary caretaking. When fathers were able to make
29such a showing, no primary caretaker preference was given; the
23. MINN. STAT. § 518.18(c) (2000); Crippen, supra note 20, at 442; cf State ex
rel. Nelson v. Whaley, 246 Minn. 535, 545, 75 N.W.2d 786, 792 (1956) (stating
there must be "a grave reason growing out of neglect, abandonment, incapacity,
moral delinquency, instability of character, or inability to furnish the child with
needed care" to award custody to a stranger rather than a parent).
24. Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 399-400 (Minn. 1983).
25. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 214 (Minn. 1988).
26. MINN. STAT. § 518.175, subd. 3 (2000).
27. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 396 n.3 (citing GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 8-11).
28. Gerardy v. Gerardy, 391 N.W.2d 915, 918 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(disapproving of bandying a child back and forth between parents); see also
McDermott v. McDermott, 192 Minn. 32, 36, 255 N.W. 247, 248 (1934) (finding
joint physical custody appropriate only in exceptional cases because of the
inherent divisiveness).
29. Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 713-14 (Minn. 1985) ("When the facts
demonstrate that responsibility for and performance of child care was shared by
[Vol. 28:2
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supreme court never found occasion to review this major
development in the application of its decision in Pikula.
Four years after Pikula, the legislature amended the list of best
interest factors by adding a statement that prohibited the court
from using "one factor to the exclusion of all others. ": o This
change occurred because fathers contended that Pikula caused the
courts to unduly confine their consideration of statutory best
interest factors and thus deprive fathers of success in their efforts to
obtain placements of child custody.3' The amendment further
required the court to make detailed findings on all factors.3 Even
after the legislature eroded the preference for the primary
both parents in an entirely equal way, then no preference arises and the court
must limit its inquiry to other indicia of parental fitness.").
30. Act of May 25, 1989, ch. 248, § 2, 1989 Minn. Laws 834, 836 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (Supp. 1989)).
31. Hearing on S.Y No. 573 Before the Civil Law Subdivision of the S. Judiciary
Comm., 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. Apr. 5, 1989) (statement of Sen. Spear).
Senator Spear stated:
Now the effect of the Pikula decision has been that all of the statutory
definitions of the best interests of the child which appear in section
518.17, subdivision 1, had to be ignored, and the Pikula standard is the
one standard that the courts are considering. This has been a major
complaint of the groups that represent fathers and noncustodial
parents and I think it's a legitimate one because the primary caretaker
standard tends to be a mother-oriented standard in our society, at least
in most households, and the Pikula standard makes it harder for a
father to get custody of the child.
What this section does is that it puts the Pikula standard within the
context of the other standards that we have in the statute, the best
interests of the child, it lists it, it makes the Pikula standard the 1 th
definition factor [the committee later rearranged the factors] to be
considered by the court in the determining the best interests of the
child and then says that none of these factors should be controlling in
determining custody. Instead of the primary caretaker standard
overriding everything else, it is merely one of the things that the courts
would take into consideration in determining the best interests of the
child.
Id. Senator Berglund then expressed concern about the custody of very young
children. In response, Senator Spear stated that the new language would not
"force the court to tear a baby away from a mother's breast." Id. For a discussion
of the Minnesota State Bar Association's support for this change, see Crippen,
supra note 20, at 494 n.227; cf Fineman, supra note 1, at 730, 768-69 (noting that
custodial mothers as a group are unorganized, unrepresented, and disadvantaged
in the political process).
32. The amendment states: "The court must make detailed findings on each
of the factors and explain how the factors led to its conclusions and to the
determination of the best interests of the child." Act of May 25, 1989, ch. 248, § 2,
1989 Minn. Laws 834, 836 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (Supp. 1989)).
2001]
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caretaker, when reflecting on the best-interest factors, the supreme
court in Maxfield stated that primary caretaking is "the golden
thread running through any best interests analysis 3 3 because it
bears on all other factors. In response, the legislature further
clarified its intent, amending the statute once again to declare that
"l[t] he primary caretaker factor may not be used as a presumption
in determining the best interests of the child.,34 Notably, the court
has neither withdrawn nor altered its "golden thread" analysis,
despite the legislature's subsequent amendment to the best-interest
factors. ' Likewise, the court has yet to discount its earlier
announcement of a goal to make custody decision-making more
predictable.
Even though the "golden thread" analysis has never been
refuted, Minnesota courts have heeded the legislature's
admonishment and there is no record that the preference was
subsequently used to justify a preference-like decision premised on
other factors. Furthermore, no appellate decision records an
attempt to determine the legislative prerogative to declare as a
matter of fact, based on political considerations, that a primary
caretaker presumption offends strong evidence on the best
33. Maxfield v. Maxfield, 452 N.W.2d 219, 223 (Minn. 1990).
34. Act of May 3, 1990, ch. 574, § 13, 1990 Minn. Laws 2123, 2132 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (1990)). Senator Knaak introduced the amendment on the
Senate floor. 5 STATE OF MINN. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE: 76TH LEG. SESS. 7979
(daily ed. Apr. 9, 1990). After Senator Knaak explained the text of the
amendment, Senator Spear clarified the intent:
Senator Spear: I think if I understand this amendment correctly, I
think I support it. Last year we redrafted this section of the law and we
included-we added the provision that you see on page two lines 11-12:
"The court may not use one factor to the exclusion of all others."
Because what had been happening since the Pikula decision was that
the primary caretaker factor seemed to be used to the exclusion of all
others.
Now since that time there has been a decision called the Maxfield
decision and in that decision the court read what we did last year but
didn't seem to believe it and didn't seem to believe that we meant what
we said and so I think, Senator Knaak, is this an attempt to give the
court another message and to tell them that the Maxfield decision was an
incorrect interpretation of what we did last year?
Senator Knaak: Mr. President, Senator Spear-It's in English and I
believe the court can read it.
Audio tape: Senate Floor Session on H.F. 1855 (Minn. Apr. 9, 1990) (tape 1, side
B). After a little more discussion, the amendment passed. Id.
35. Infra note 34 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 28:2
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interests of the child, 6 even though the Minnesota Supreme Court
has consistently defended its ability to look past statutory standards
as an exercise of equitable powers in determining the best interests
of the child and the legal interests of divorcing parents. 37 Thus, the
flight is substantial, from a preference favoring primary caretakers
to a legislated declaration that the preference is anathema.
In retrospect, it is intriguing to inquire about the analysis that
prompted efforts to decimate the primary caretaker preference and
support, instead, those arrangements that go further to demand
active contact with both parents, even if the child has a primary
caretaker parent. Are these developments entirely in the realm of
determining justice for parents? Alternatively, if the best interests
of children lie behind what has occurred, is it significant that a
preference for the stable relationship with a primary parent was
expressly based in prominent social research and thought?8  Is
36. Cf State ex rel. Flint v. Flint, 63 Minn. 187, 189, 65 N.W. 272, 273 (1895)
(upholding custody award to the mother notwithstanding the statutory imperative
that the father shall have custody). A child's "fight to ajust determination of her
best interests is fully as important as a person's right to be free from incarceration
by the State." Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012, 1027 (5th Cir. 1969) (Rives, J.,
dissenting). But see In re Welfare of J.M., 574 N.W.2d 717, 722 (Minn. 1998)
(finding that canons of statutory interpretation barred the court from ordering "a
statutorily-prohibited placement" of long-term foster care for a child under 12
years of age).
37. Early on, Justice Cardozo stated the equity court's inherent power to
order a statutorily-prohibited remedy in the best interests of the child. Finlay v.
Finlay, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (N.Y. 1925). Minnesota courts have invoked their
inherent power to grant equitable relief "as the facts in each particular case and
the ends of justice may require." Johnston v. Johnston, 280 Minn. 81, 86, 158
N.W.2d 249, 254 (1968); see also DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 758
(Minn. 1981) (finding district court has inherent power in family law cases to
grant relief as facts and equities require); flint, 63 Minn. at 189-90, 65 N.W. at 273
(holding statutory mandate that custody be awarded to the father did not prohibit
court's decision to place the child with its mother); Kimmel v. Kimmel, 392
N.W.2d 904, 908 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (finding court had equitable power to
disregard statutory procedure when child's welfare in jeopardy). Infringing on
the court's equitable powers can violate separation of powers. Holmberg v.
Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d 720, 725-26 (Minn. 1999) (finding statutory process
violated separation of powers by infringing on court's original, equitable
jurisdiction in family law).
38. See generally Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705,711 (Minn. 1985) (citing
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7 (documenting the need for the child to maintain
relationship with primary parent)); Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 396 n.3 (Minn.
1983); see also In re Custody of D.G., 246 N.W.2d 892, 895-96 (N.D. 1976)
(embracing Beyond the Best Interests of the Child and the importance of continuity in
a child's life to reverse a child custody placement with the father and to place
permanent custody with grandparents).
20011
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there predominating evidence to debunk this support, suggesting
the merit for a higher preference for keeping the child in contact
with a secondary parent? Or do either lines of thought rise above
the level of anecdotal psychological opinion, susceptible to
faddishness?
Perhaps a more pragmatic consideration lies behind many
developments in child custody law. Part of the rationale for any
preference, expressly so in respect to the preference for primary
parents, rests in the need for certainty and for avoidance of
litigation.39 Loss of confidence in the preference may have been
due to the Minnesota approach to the preference, which made the
preference less certain and precise than expected.40 And a
preference for shared custody may reflect an alternative view,
especially on the part of lawyers and trial judges, that shared
arrangements induce parents quarreling in respect to their own
justice interests to settle their differences.
Just as the primary caretaker preference lost favor without
refutation of one of its scientific bases, another anomaly is evident.
As previously observed, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
recognized that identification of the primary caretaker is the
"golden thread" running through the best interest considerations.41
Is there any reason to doubt that this observation is accurate?
IV. JOINT PHYSICAL CUSTODY
A new interest of policymakers in joint physical custody arose
in the wake of efforts to diminish the preference for mothers as
sole custodians of their children after divorce. This development
suggests a lapse in the influence of Beyond the Best Interests of the
Child and the end of influence of the McDermott line of cases
42disfavoring this arrangement. As part of this development, the
39. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20 (discussing rationale for
preference); see infra note 48 (discussing uncertainty of outcomes).
40. Crippen, supra note 20, at 452-95 (discussing the Minnesota approach
and its problems).
41. See Maxfield v. Maxfield, 452 N.W.2d 219, 223 (Minn. 1990); supra text
accompanying note 33.
42. Minnesota law mandates use of a rebuttable presumption that requested
joint legal custody is in the best interests of the children, but does not favor or
disfavor joint physical custody. MINN. STAT. § 518.17, subd. 2 (2000).
Approximately six states and the District of Columbia have a joint custody
presumption, two states have a preference for joint custody, and six states employ
a presumption that joint custody is in the best interests of the child if the parents
[Vol. 28:2
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collateral legal considerations provided for sole custodians have
become avoidable, often with support of Minnesota's appellate
courts. In joint physical custody cases, the Auge presumption that a
primary parent can relocate to another state with the child does
not apply because stability for the child requires regular contact
with both parents.43  Instead, the court applies the best interests
standard.44 Likewise, both parents are child support obligors and
the primary physical custodian is not entitled to a straightforward
guidelines amount of child support. Both the legislature and the
courts, however, have upheld the danger standard as a means to
413protect the permanency of arrangements.
Attendant characteristics of sole and joint custody have
become even more important because appellate courts insist on47
following the label, no matter the real nature of the placement -
arguably, in the instance of child support, depriving the primary
caretaker of an entitlement definitively determined by the
agree to it. Margaret Martin Barry, The District of Columbia's Joint Custody
Presumption: Misplaced Blame and Simplistic Solutions, 46 CATH. U. L. REv. 767, app.
at 825-830 (1997).
43. Hegerle v. Hegerle, 355 N.W.2d 726, 731 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
44. MINN. STAT. § 518.18(d) (2000).
45. The Hortis decision recognized that when a joint custody arrangement
results in each parent being a non-custodial parent for six months of the year, that
parent should pay child support only during those six months when the child
resides with the other parent. Hortis v. Hortis, 367 N.W.2d 633, 635 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985); see also Valento v. Valento, 385 N.W.2d 860, 862 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(applying the same method to a joint custody arrangement even though the
parents divided physical care 57%/43%).
46. MINN. STAT. § 518.18(e) (2000); see also Lutzi v. Lutzi, 485 N.W.2d 311,
315 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (employing the endangerment standard when a
parent, who was designated the sole physical custodian, wished to substantially
restructure an equally-shared custody arrangement by moving the children several
miles away and to a new school district); cf. Frauenshuh v. Giese, 599 N.W.2d 153,
157-58 (Minn. 1999) (finding only joint physical custodians can agree to the best
interests standard for modification).
47. Blonigen v. Blonigen, 621 N.W.2d 276, 281-82 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); see
also Rogers v. Rogers, 622 N.W.2d 813, 821 (Minn. 2001) (finding that parent not
entitled to Hortis/Valento benefits without successful negotiating or otherwise
obtaining ajoint physical custody award and holding guidelines will be upheld for
sole-custody awards); Ayers v. Ayers, 508 N.W.2d 515, 520 (Minn. 1993) (applying
the best interests standard instead of the endangerment standard when evaluating
a primary caretaker's request to modify the decree and move the child because the
stipulation stated 'Joint physical custody"); Wilson v. Wilson, No. C6-97-562, 1997
WL 559735, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 1997) (unpublished opinion) (applying
the endangerment standard to a custody-modification case because of the sole-
physical-custodian label even though the parent opposing removal of the child
from the state was a de facto joint-physical custodian).
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legislature. Tolerance for joint physical custody creates a prospect
for unwarranted compromise in favor of a non-primary caretaker
who claims an interest in having generous privileges to be with the
child. But there is a greater collateral effect: openness to the
arrangement invites a syndrome of bargaining pressure in
determining custody and support decisions or using custody issues
to gain other advantages.48 To guarantee a just application of the
child support guidelines for primary physical custodians, courts
must look past the label4 9
V. PARENTING PLANS
Effective for 2001, the Minnesota Legislature created
parenting plans as an option for divorcing couples.50 The plans
create flexibility and use language designed to decrease conflict in
divorce. "Parenting time"" has replaced visitation, a child's
"primary residence" has replaced the custodial home, and if the
parties do not like the new terminology, they are free to use
whatever language they desire, as long as the parenting plan
defines the relationships and responsibilities they create. Finally,
with reference to the last vestige of legislative preference for
preserving stable circumstances of the children in divorce cases, the
statute provides that the parties may agree that the court should
use the best interests of the child standard for modification of any
part of the plan.53
Whatever the merit of parenting plans in eliminating
traditional labels, the plans can fully compromise preservation of
48. "[U]ncertainty about the outcome of custody disputes leads to the
irresistible temptation to trade the custody of the child in return for lower alimony
and child support payments." Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 356, 360 (W. Va.
1981). "Widespread reports exist of women giving in on alimony and other
economic claims in the face of husbands' new demands for custody of the children
(whether they actually want it or not)." JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER 211
(2000); see alsoJessica Pearson & Maria A. Luchesi Ring, Judicial Decision-Making in
Contested Custody Cases, 21J. FAM. L. 703, 721 (1983) (citing older judges' opinions
that "fathers who wanted custody were simply trying to avoid child support
payments or to ensnare their ex-wives in an abusive relationship" but also citing
one contrary opinion).
49. Blonigen, 621 N.W.2d at 283-85 (Crippen,J., dissenting).
50. MINN. STAT. § 518.1705 (Supp. 2001). For a general history and
description of the statute, see Peter V. Rother, Balancing Custody Issues: Minnesota's
New Parenting Plan Statute, 57 BENCH & B. OF MINN. 27, 28 (Dec. 2000).
51. MINN. STAT. § 518.003, subd. 5 (2000).
52. MINN. STAT. § 518.1705, subd. 2(c) (2000).
53. Id. at subd. 9.
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the primary caretaker-child relationship. Even though the
language used to describe the relationships changed, and neither
primary caretakers nor custodial mothers exist as legal categories,
"they exist as an institution-as a practical reality experienced by
many children of divorce and their mothers. ' '54  As with all
negotiated settlements, however, the primary caretaker must
bargain over parenting time and where the child's primary
residence will be. In this instance, there is no presumption that the
court will apply the child support guidelines to respect the reality
of the situation, respect the interest of the child in joining a parent
in a move, or apply the child-endangerment standard for
modification. For those parties who choose to apply the child
support guidelines, even when the plan does not use the label of
joint custody or sole-physical custody, it is not evident that the law
favors full child-support-guidelines benefits or discourages viewing
each parent as a child-support obligor. 5
Even though the courts are involved almost exclusively in high
conflict divorces and parenting plans are designed for those
divorcing couples who are committed to cooperating with each
other, the legislature provided for court-ordered parenting plans.57
The House and Senate disagreed over whether to give the courts
the power to create a parenting plan, and senators found assurance
in the fact that the court would have only those powers it had
already under the traditional arrangements. Eventually, the
committee approved the provision granting the court the power to
create a parenting plan after Senate and House counsel drafted
onto the Senate version language intending to declare that new
court powers were not being created. 59 Although the legislature
54. Fineman, supra note 1, at 733 (noting "It]he change in rhetoric
disadvantages functioning custodial mothers and their children, the occupants of
the shadow institution of sole-custody parenting, who have not had a voice in
custodial laws.").
55. Rother, supra note 50, at 29.
56. Gerald W. Hardcastle, Joint Custody: A Family Court Judge's Perspective, 32
FAM. L.Q. 201, 214 (1998) ("To judges hearing contested matters, the conflicted
couple is not an incidental aberration. The conflicted couple is the norm. In this
context of contested custody litigation, joint custody clearly raises concern.").
57. MINN. STAT. § 518.1705, subd. 3(b) (2000).
58. Parenting Plans, 2000: Hearing on S.F 3169/H.F 3311 Before the Senate
Conference Committee, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2000), available on audio tape:
Hearing Before the Senate Conference Committee on S.F. 3169/H.F. 3311 (Apr.
6, 2000) (tape 1, side B).
59. Parenting Plans, 2000: Hearing on S.F 3169/H.F 3311 Before the Senate
Conference Committee, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2000), available on audio tape:
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did not intend to give the court any new powers, at least one
commentator has noted a potential ambiguity that could give the
court power to mandate a parenting plan when the parties did not
agree to it. The impact of court-ordered parenting plans remains
to be seen.
VI. PRIMARY CARETAKERS AT THE POVERTY LEVEL
Primary caretakers living at the poverty level face added
barriers and fewer options for custodial arrangements when
seeking custody of their children. Even for those who obtain
representation through a legal services program a6 any desire for
equally-shared parenting after divorce may not be an option
because the parents cannot afford to maintain two households.
What is more, the concept of equal caretaking may be
inappropriate at best for families that do not fit the unspoken
norm of white, middle class households on which the concept is
based."-
Hearing Before the Senate Conference Committee on S.F. 3169/H.F. 3311 (Apr.
10, 2000) (tape 1, side A) (statements of Rep. Dawkins and Ms. McKnight).
60. Rother, supra note 50, at 28 (comparing MINN. STAT. § 518.1705, subd.
3(b) (2000) ("If both parents do not agree to a parenting plan, the court may
create one on its own motion ...."), with MINN. STAT. § 518.1705, subd. 5 (2000)
("If both parents agree to the use of a parenting plan but are unable to agree on
all terms, the court may create a parenting plan under this section.")).
61. Minnesota courts have acknowledged that costs eventually will preclude
access to the courts for the resolution of family law disputes for all but the very
wealthy. Sinsabaugh v. Heinerscheid, 428 N.W.2d 476, 481 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998)
(Foley, J., concurring specially) ("It strikes me that if restraint is not practiced in
the area of family law litigation, the time will come when only the very wealthy will
be able to litigate these matters, and yet custody issues are often at the very heart
of family law disputes at all social and economic levels.").
62. Minnesota employs a joint custody presumption when one of the parties
requests it, but this arrangement is not appropriate for all families. For example,
the presumption is not appropriate for the predominantly Black community of
Washington D.C., where much of the population lives in poverty. Barry, supra
note 42, at 773. Professor Barry first notes that the presumption is "based on
white, middle class precepts of gender rights and privileges regarding the raising
of children" that does not account for the reality of D.C. households. Id; see also
Hardcastle, supra note 56, at 213 ("[O1ne is left with the feeling that joint custody
is an upper-middle class phenomenon. Seeking to impose this custody
arrangement on young, uneducated parents or socio-economically disadvantaged
parents is arrogant and may add stress to the post-divorce process.").
Professor Barry highlights the increased costs for post-divorce households
and notes that the increase significantly impacts families living at or below the
poverty line. Barry, supra note 42, at 788-89. She also notes that the presumption
that joint custody is in the best interests of the child does not take into account
[Vol. 28:2
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Because the custodial label or parenting plan arrangement
affects the parent's ability to meet the child's basic needs, access to
public assistance programs should be considered. In order to be
eligible for benefits under the Minnesota Family Investment
Program (MFIP), the "minor child and a caregiver must live- 63 -
together." If the child resides out of the home for too long, when
on vacation or visiting with a non-custodial parent, the custodial
parent may lose eligibility for benefits. Without benefits, there is a
great danger that the child will have no home to return to when
the visitation period ends. Although the statute does address
eligibility for benefits when the court order specifies joint legal or
joint physical custody,64 it does not specify how the court should
determine eligibility when the parties do not employ the joint
custody label. If society has a genuine interest in promoting shared
parenting, financial considerations should be addressed for parents
living at or below the poverty level. Otherwise, the ideal of equally-
shared parenting is effectively eliminated because only one parent
can receive benefits and the parents cannot afford to maintain two
separate homes.
MFIP could be structured to provide a safety net for divorced
parents if the concepts of equally-shared parenting and joint
custody were made accessible to all children and their parents. But
welfare reform that extends benefits to more people is politically
unpopular and unlikely to occur. Further, because legislators
refuse to consider the impact of custody laws on families of diverse
economic circumstances, they create other obstacles to arranging
custody in the best interests of these children. The conference
committee that worked on the parenting plan legislation provides
the following example of this process in action.
"the hardship faced by the parent who shoulders the bulk of the financial
responsibility by virtue of de facto sole physical custody, with little contribution
from the parent who fails to meet the obligations ordered by the court. Id. at 789.
A return to court could solve the problem of obtaining child-support arrearages if
the other parent has the ability to pay, but cost precludes the ability of primary
caretakers living at the poverty level from returning to court. See id.
Although Minnesota does not have a joint physical custody presumption, the
problems Professor Barry highlights for the population she works with apply to
impoverished families as a whole. As Minnesota progresses to the legislative ideal
of equally-shared parenting, courts should not overlook parental discord as an
important impediment to the effectiveness of a parenting plan or a joint custody
arrangement.
63. MINN. STAT. § 256J.13, subd. 2 (2000).
64. MINN. STAT. § 256J.15, subd. 1 (2000).
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When Nancy Mischel of the Legal Services Advocacy Project
attempted to alert the committee to the possible impact a
parenting plan could have on a parent's eligibility for public
assistance, the committee members responded with resentment
instead of concern, murmuring "Aren't we trying to get people off
welfare? "5 When the subject came up again at the next meeting,
Senator Foley expressed concern about the stability of a family
living on the margins and proposed to delay the effectiveness date
for the legislation. 6 But the majority view prevailed out of fear that
a parent would attempt to control a custody determination by
applying for public assistance before the court made its final
decision. Allowing these fears to prevail hampers the best interests
of children because "[t]he single most important determinant of
child well-being after divorce is living in a household with adequate
income.""
Although policymakers should consider all the possible
messages that legislation could send to citizens, they should not
allow hypothetical, worst-case scenarios of welfare abuse to override
concrete concerns. Arguments against considering public
assistance in conjunction with custody law when the parents have
the ability to meet a child's basic needs "fall apart when children
are in danger of being deprived of the essentials of existence."68
The reality is that divorce impoverishes women and children. Data
from the 2000 census show that more than twice as many single
mothers as single fathers have incomes below the poverty level-
thirty-four percent of single mothers compared with sixteen
percent of single fathers69-and one in six (twelve million) children
65. Parenting Plans, 2000: Hearing on S.F 3169/H.F 3311 Before the Senate
Conference Committee, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2000), available on audio tape:
Hearings Before the Senate Conference Committee on S.F. 3169/H.F. 3311 (Apr.
6, 2000) (tape 1, side B).
66. Parenting Plans, 2000: Hearing on S.F 3169/H.F 3311 Before the Senate
Conference Committee, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2000), available on audio tape:
Hearings Before the Senate Conference Committee on S.F. 3169/H.F. 3311 (Apr.
10, 2000) (tape 1, side B) (comments of Sen. Foley).
67. Diane N. Lye, What The Experts Say: Scholarly Research On Post-Divorce
Parenting and Child Well-Being, REPORT TO THE WASHINGTON STATE GENDER AND
JUSTICE COMMISSION AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS COMMISSION (1999), available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/parent/chap4.htm.
68. Carolyn J. Frantz, Note, Eliminating Consideration of Parental Wealth in Post-
Divorce Child Custody Disputes, 99 MICH. L. REv. 216, 235-36 (2000) (arguing for an
exception to the general policy of prohibiting wealth as a factor in custody
disputes).
69. Fields & Casper, supra note 12, at 8 tbl.4.
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in the United States lives in poverty.
Until the option of maintaining two custodial homes is
available to everyone, primary caretakers living at or below the
poverty level and their advocates must choose custody labels and
arrangements that best preserve the economic well-being of the
parents in order to ensure a custody arrangement in the best
interests of the child. This means that primary caretakers must
continue to struggle for sole physical custody because child-support
guidelines will be applied more favorably for them, provided that
their ex-spouses have the ability to pay child support. For those
whose ex-spouses cannot pay child support, the sole-custody label
will help primary caretakers receive public benefits to provide for
the basic needs of their children. For primary caretakers who want
to take advantage of the new parenting plan legislation, they must
carefully evaluate how the arrangements affect their eligibility for
public assistance, which probably excludes a completely shared
parenting arrangement. Likewise, they must evaluate their ability
to relocate with the child when the primary caretaker finds (better)
employment, which means retaining the child-endangerment
standard for modification. Moreover, any court considering the
imposition of a parenting plan on parties who live at or below the
poverty level should consider how the plan will economically affect
the ability of the parents to provide for their children's needs.
VII. CONCLUSION
Efforts at improving custody law have not been neutral, and
the class of parents who are primary caretakers, most frequently
mothers, face obstacles that are likely to produce unjust placement
decisions. Policymakers have denigrated a preference for
placement of sole custody with these parents and encouraged
demands for joint custody and parenting plans. The danger to
children lies partly in the greater probability of judicial decisions,
premised on statutory law, that limit the child's enjoyment of a sole
custodian who receives adequate child support, has appropriate
freedom in selecting employment and residence, and is protected
by the permanence of the appropriate custody placement. And
partly, the peril will occur in the decision of primary parents to join
in stipulations that reflect a poor bargaining position of the
70. Somini Sengupta, How Many Poor Children Is Too Many?, N.Y. TIMES,July 8,
2001, at WK3 (citing 1999 figures).
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primary parent and the children. For the future, the sensible
development of child-custody standards will reflect greater
awareness of the primary-caretaking relationship in the continuing
development of child support law, but more particular
developments should also occur.
First, more should be known about the actual experiences of
parents when the custody of their children is determined as part of
their divorce. Research about the primary-caretaker relationship,
its characteristics, and means to reliably identify it is needed.
Research is also needed to demonstrate the actual peril of primary
caretakers, especially mothers, in negotiations leading to
stipulations and in judicial determinations of custody. In addition,
we should obtain more evidence on the experiences of children
whose primary parent relationship is compromised, especially by a
reduced child support award that coincides with labeling an
arrangement as joint physical custody. Research on the effects of
all custodial arrangements on families living at or below the poverty
level is particularly warranted.
Such social science research will enlighten legislators and
judges on conflicting views as to whether children with primary
caretakers are best served by a preference for stable relationships
with their primary parents or by giving priority to efforts at
maintaining a strong relationship with both parents. It is evident
that existing law reflects occasional dominance of both views. Is
there good reason for one preference dominating the other?
Second, on information presently at hand, the legislature must
be wary of proposals that create a presumption favoring joint
physical custody.' Trial courts must also be attentive to the
primary-caretaking consideration in dealing with custody-standard
decisions. Finally, given the challenge, the supreme court should
renew its commitment to promoting the best interests of children,
whose deepest bond is with a primary parent, by reaffirming its
"golden thread" analysis.
The supreme court has not addressed child custody standards
in more than a decade. This may be due to the fact that the legal
profession tends to dwell on its traditional concerns for crime,
business relations, and civil-damages litigation, thereby neglecting
the present reality that over half of trial court filings, exclusive of
71. See generally Hardcastle, supra note 56 (evaluating the pitfalls of a
presumption and the need to evaluate each case on its own merits).
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traffic-regulation matters, deal with personal welfare issues such as
divorce, protection of children, juvenile delinquency, and
involuntary hospitalization. One of the most important future
supreme court issues regards the extent to which the court will
limit or uphold the legislative prerogative to declare what is best for
a child, keeping in mind the judicial role in determining equity,
the court's longstanding deference to trial court discretion in
deciding custody questions, and the historic resolve of the court to
treat the judicial assessment of a child's interests as paramount to
general legislation on placement of child custody.
72. Gary Cfippen, The Abundance of Family Law Appeals: Too Much of a Good
Thing?, 26 FAM. L.Q. 85, 86 (1992).
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